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BACK TO THE FUTURE: HOW ILLINOIS’ LEGALIZATION OF SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS RETROACTIVELY AFFECTS MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ERIC J. SHINABARGER*
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, there was an Illinois same-sex couple, whom we 
will call Richie and Homer. Richie and Homer dated for years and finally 
decided to tie the knot in 2002. However, at the time, Illinois refused to 
recognize any same-sex relationships. Therefore, the happy couple took 
matters into their own hands by traveling to Vermont to enter into a civil 
union. Afterwards, they returned to Illinois and started their lives together. 
Richie thrived financially by starting his own successful business while 
Homer primarily managed their shared home and occasionally worked part-
time. For the next decade, they acted as though they were legal spouses by 
sharing a bank account, buying a house together, and even owning a family 
dog. In 2011, Illinois began recognizing same-sex civil unions and the cou-
ple, for the first time, had a legal relationship in Illinois. Alas, in 2012, the 
relationship began to fall apart and the couple separated both informally 
and legally. As part of dissolving their legal relationship, Richie and Homer 
begin the process of equitably dividing their shared assets. However, the 
parties cannot agree on what property they are required to divide under 
Illinois law. Richie claims that the couple did not begin acquiring shared 
marital property until Illinois recognized same-sex unions in 2011. Homer, 
on the other hand, claims that they began acquiring marital property the 
moment the two entered into a legal relationship in Vermont. 
The question is then: When did Homer and Richie begin acquiring 
marital property and what effect does that determination have on their 
property rights? To that end, this paper discusses Illinois’ treatment of the 
division of marital property followed by an analysis on the Illinois Reli-
gious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act (Civil Union Act) to deter-
mine whether it should be applied retroactively or prospectively. In our 
hypothetical situation, this determination will dictate the amount of marital 
property subject to division between Homer and Richie. The further back a 
* Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2015. I would like to thank Professor Mickie Piatt for her 
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court goes to recognize the start of the legal relationship, the more property 
it puts in the marital property pot. 
The division of marital property following the breakdown of a rela-
tionship is not a novel source of litigation. However, constant changes to 
the way society views familial roles and the ever-changing definitions of 
those roles regularly add new wrinkles to this centuries old problem. 
Should women’s contributions within the home count towards marital 
property? What about a gift from a rich uncle to one spouse? The value of a 
graduate degree one spouse earned while the other financially supported 
the family? The list of potential flash points and their permutations is end-
less and the result is a unique and complex area of law. 
The analysis becomes even cloudier by adding the hottest topic in the 
so-called culture war—same-sex relationships—to the equation. In Illinois, 
the same laws dividing marital property apply to same-sex couples as well, 
but with an added twist. Before 2011, many couples like Richie and 
Homer—who did not want to wait for Illinois to recognize same-sex rela-
tionships—traveled to other states on the front line of the legalization fight 
to enter into same-sex civil unions or marriages. Such couples then re-
turned to Illinois and acted as though they formed a legal partnership even 
if the state did not recognize the change. 
When the Illinois legislature legalized same-sex civil unions by enact-
ing the Civil Union Act on June 1, 2011, and completed the legalization 
process two years later by legalizing same-sex marriages under the Reli-
gious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act (Fairness Act), the status of 
these couples was thrown into limbo.1 Under both of these statutes, Illinois 
agreed to recognize relationships formed in other states without clarifying 
whether or not this reciprocity extends to relationships entered into before 
Illinois legalized same-sex relationships.2 Without clear legislative intent, 
the statutes leave Illinois courts to their own devices in determining the 
retroactive effect of these statutes. Because the Fairness Act only recently 
took effect—on June 1, 2014—this paper will primarily analyze this ques-
tion through the lens of the Civil Union Act.3 The analysis regarding retro-
activity is the same for both statutes. 
This paper analyzes the potential for the retroactive application of the 
Act from several different points of view. First, it is necessary to under-
stand divorce law in Illinois as the fledgling Civil Union Act case law con-
sistently looks to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 
 1.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (2011); S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
 2.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/60; S.B. 10.
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(Marriage Act) as a guide. Second, I analyze the structure of same-sex civil 
unions now legalized in Illinois based on the text of the Civil Union Act. 
Third, the Civil Union Act only has a retroactive application if it does not 
affect substantive rights of parties unless the legislature explicitly indicated 
the Act’s intended temporal reach. Additionally, Illinois case law interpret-
ing the Marriage Act provides valuable insight into how courts should in-
terpret the Act because both statutes explicitly adopt the Marriage Act and 
both acts state that their purpose is to ensure that same-sex couples have the 
same rights and duties as heterosexual married couples. Fourth, a court 
should also consider the parties’ intent as traditional contract law dictates 
that parties should be held to their bargained-for agreement. Financial ac-
tions taken in contemplation of marriage may also be binding in Illinois. 
Finally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not force Illinois to recognize 
same-sex relationships in 2002 because the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA) protects states’ abilities to create their own laws regarding same-
sex relationships. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the courts should not retroac-
tively apply the Act, as doing so would drastically alter the substantive 
rights of the parties involved. It is hard to know what Richie and Homer 
thought the legal effect of their Vermont unionization was in 2002, so it is 
impossible to hold the parties to their true intent. While Illinois courts do 
take party intent into account to determine the retroactive application of 
marital property purchased in contemplation of marriage, this doctrine is 
very narrow.4 It is unlikely that such an argument would succeed twelve 
years after the unionization when party intent is so murky. Additionally, 
traditional marriage case law shows that Illinois courts treat invalid mar-
riages that are subsequently perfected as effective on the date of perfection 
rather than the initial ceremony. Therefore, the Civil Union Act should not 
retroactively apply and Richie and Homer began acquiring marital property 
on June 1, 2011.
I. DIVORCE IN ILLINOIS
Within the last century, as divorce became more commonplace and 
recognition of a stay-at-home parent’s contribution to the family increased, 
the old common law notion—that each partner in a relationship carries his 
or her own property both into and out of the relationship—has approached 





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 176 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P12 - SHINABARGER (FINAL).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2014 11:11 AM 
338 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
extinction.5 By 1970, the rise of no-fault divorce legislation and proposed 
reforms by The National Conference of Commissioners of State Laws 
(ULC) opened the floodgates for marital property reform.6 Illinois soon 
adopted its own marital property reform act based upon the ULC’s model 
statute in 1977 by enacting the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act (Marriage Act).7 These reforms adopted the concept of equitable 
distribution when dividing marital assets, in which the marriage relation-
ship is defined as a partnership or shared enterprise and both partners are 
equally entitled to the fruits of that enterprise.8 Under the equitable distri-
bution doctrine, marital misconduct is not relevant to the distribution of 
property unless it demonstrates financial misdeeds.9
Section 503 of the Marriage Act defines marital property as “all prop-
erty acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage” and creates a 
presumption that any property acquired by either party during the marriage 
is marital property.10 From the outset, Illinois courts supported this pre-
sumption and actively pursued the principles of equitable distribution.11
The few recognized exceptions to marital property include property ac-
quired by one spouse prior to the marriage, gifts received by a spouse dur-
ing marriage, and property that the owner never comingled with marital 
assets.12 All other property deemed “marital” is subject to equitable distri-
bution by the courts.13 The division of property does not require mathemat-
ical equality, but rather, must be equitable in nature based on factors such 
as the contributions of each party, the duration of the marriage, and rele-
vant future economic circumstances.14
Therefore, the courts presume that all property acquired by either 
spouse after the marriage and before the entry of a judgment for dissolution 
 5.  Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 79 
(1991). 
 6.  See generally UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (1973). 
 7.  See In re Marriage of Komnick, 417 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (Ill. 1981) (stating that the Illinois 
Marriage and Dissolution Act is based on the ULC’s Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act). 
 8.  See id. (holding that the “distribution of property is based in part on the contributions of each 
spouse to the marital relationship as well as to the accumulation of wealth or property.”). 
 9.  See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 cmt. (stating that “the court is expressly admon-
ished not to consider the misconduct of a spouse during the marriage.”). 
 10.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503 (2013).  
 11.  See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (Ill. 1978). 
 12.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503. 
 13.  Debra DiMaggio, The “Prodigious Spouse”: Equitable Distribution and Wealthy Wage 
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of marriage is marital property regardless of how the parties treat the prop-
erty or hold the title.15 It is possible to overcome this presumption, but do-
ing so is not an easy task. The burden of proof rests with the party seeking 
to show that the property is non-marital, and the party must do so by clear 
and convincing evidence.16 Marital property also extends to most business 
interests, such as partnerships, interests in corporations, stock options, and 
income.17 For instance, if one spouse has an interest in a partnership, that 
spouse will retain control of the partnership, “but the court may award to 
the other spouse property or a sum of money to be paid in recognition of 
the rights of the spouse who is not a member of the professional partner-
ship.”18 While the court may not insert the non-owning spouse into a busi-
ness relationship (e.g., a partnership, individually owned business, or farm), 
the court may distribute property based on accumulated income and assets 
coming from those relationships. Even property owned by a corporation—
an entity that is in and of itself marital property subject to equitable distri-
bution—controlled by one spouse is presumed to be marital property.19
Applying these principles, it is evident that if a court determines that 
Homer and Richie began acquiring marital property after their 2002 union-
ization in Vermont, it must equitably divide all assets acquired after that 
date between the two. Richie will receive consideration for his work in 
starting his own business20 and retain his interest in that endeavor, but 
Homer will receive consideration for both his work in the household and 
the fact that Richie’s future economic earning power is much higher.21
Although Homer may not receive a mathematical half of all Homer’s as-
sets, a court seeking an equitable division is very likely to reach a figure 
that is near half. Therefore, this case, with millions of dollars hypothetical-
ly at stake, turns on the question of the exact date the couple began acquir-
ing marital property. 
 15.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(b). 
 16.  In re Marriage of Schmitt, 909 N.E.2d 221, 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 17.  MARSHALL J. AUERBACH ET AL., ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., ILLINOIS FAMILY 
LAW: PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF DISSOLUTION ACTIONS § 4.21 (2011). 
 18.  Id.
 19.  In re Schmitt, 909 N.E.2d at 229–30. 
 20.  See In re Marriage of Woodward, 404 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that it is 
not an abuse of discretion to consider one party’s contributions in determining just distribution). 
 21.  See In re Marriage of Gaumer, 785 N.E.2d 122, 125–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a 
distribution was just even though the husband was the sole provider because the wife supported the 
husband by working at home, the marriage was long, and the income in question was the only way the 
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II. LEGALIZATION OF CIVIL UNIONS
Before 2011, Illinois did not recognize partnerships between members 
of the same sex in any legal form, and the Illinois code explicitly stated that 
same-sex relationships were void as against public policy.22 Therefore, 
same-sex couples received no legal rights or responsibilities under Illinois 
law. This changed once the Civil Union Act went into effect on June 1, 
2011.23 Under the Act, civil unions are “entitled to the same legal obliga-
tions, responsibilities, protections, and benefits as are afforded or recog-
nized by the law to spouses.”24 Section 45 of the Act explicitly states that 
the courts should judge the validity of a civil union as if it was a heterosex-
ual marriage and that the same rules for dissolution apply.25 Importantly, 
the Act also contains a reciprocity provision indicating that Illinois recog-
nizes civil unions or “substantially similar legal relationship[s]” entered 
into outside of Illinois.26 Without such a provision, there would be no ques-
tion that Richie and Homer did not form a legal relationship until they took 
the necessary steps in Illinois. 
Based on the text of the Civil Union Act, it is evident that as of June 2, 
2011, Illinois considered Richie and Homer to be in a legal relationship. 
The fact that their unionization occurred in Vermont is not an issue as the 
Act explicitly and broadly recognizes such relationships entered into out of 
the state.27 Therefore, the Act dictates that the state should treat Richie and 
Homer no differently than any heterosexual spousal relationship.28 Howev-
er, this does not answer the question of when the couple entered into their 
relationship in Illinois’ eyes for purposes of property rights. Illinois could 
retroactively recognize the relationship from 2002 even though it deemed 
such relationships as “against public policy” at the time. On the other hand, 
the state could view the relationship as suddenly springing up the moment 
the Act went into effect or the moment Richie and Homer filed for a civil 
union license in Illinois. This determination will guide how the court 
should divide the couple’s property upon the dissolution of the union. 
 22.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213 (1977); 750 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/213.1 (repealed 2014) (“A 
marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex is contrary to the public policy of this State.”). 
 23.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (2011).  
 24.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/20. 
 25.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/45. 
 26.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/60 (amended 2013). 
 27.  See id.
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III. RETROACTIVITY
A. Statutory Interpretation 
Illinois courts should only apply the Act prospectively as the Act sub-
stantively affects parties’ rights, and the Act is silent regarding retroactivi-
ty. Illinois case law regarding retroactivity has a turbulent past with many 
twists and turns. In 2003, for the third time in less than a decade, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court changed procedures for determining the retroactivity 
of an Illinois statute.29
Illinois jurisprudence on retroactivity began in 1996 with First of 
America Trust Co. v. Armstead, where the court focused on whether the 
parties held vested rights rather than inquiring into legislative intent.30 The 
decision to take legislative intent out of the equation faced immediate criti-
cism, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed itself five years later in 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector.31 In that decision, the 
court reintroduced legislative intent by following the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.32 Both Landgraf 
and Commonwealth Edison determine retroactivity based first upon legisla-
tive intent and then ask the courts to substitute in their own judgment when 
the legislature did not provide guidance for a given statute’s temporal 
reach.33
Most recently, the Illinois Supreme Court again reversed itself in the 
2003 case of Caveney v. Bower.34 In Caveney, the court held that the only 
questions required in determining the retroactivity of a statute is whether 
the legislature has clearly intended for the statute to be retroactive and 
whether the law is procedural or substantive.35 If the legislature clearly 
indicated the temporal reach of a new statute, the courts should apply the 
law accordingly.36 Thus, the first prong of the Caveney test is consistent 
with both Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison.37 However, the court’s 
treatment of statutes without a clear temporal reach is where Caveney sepa-
rates from the previous decisions. When the legislature is silent about a 
 29.  Robert C. Feldmeier, The Illinois Supreme Court’s Latest Last Word on Statutory Retroactivi-
ty, 92 ILL. B.J. 260, 260–61 (2004). 
 30.  664 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ill. 1996).  
 31.  749 N.E.2d 964, 972 (Ill. 2001). 
 32.  Id.
 33.  Id.; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257 (1994). 
 34.  Caveney v. Bower, 797 N.E.2d 596, 601–02 (Ill. 2003). 
 35.  Id.
 36.  Id. at 601. 
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statute’s retroactivity, Caveney interpreted Section 4 of the Illinois Statute 
on Statutes to mandate that no law may be construed to repeal a right ac-
crued through an earlier law.38 Section 4 states: 
No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such for-
mer law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against 
the former law, or as to any act done . . . or any right accrued, or claim 
arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect an such 
offense or act so committed or done . . . or any right accrued, or claim 
arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings 
thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the 
time of such proceedings.39
In Caveney, the court interpreted this section to mean that legislative intent 
is always available, and the courts should never rely on their own judgment 
in determining retroactivity for statutes affecting the rights of the parties in 
question.40 Thus, the second prong of Landgraf, reliance on judicial judg-
ment, is irrelevant under Illinois law.41 In practice, this means that the 
courts may not apply substantive laws retroactively without a clear legisla-
tive directive while they may give procedural laws retroactive effect.42
When the legislature provides clear temporal direction within a stat-
ute, the retroactive test is simple. For instance, in Allegis Realty Investors v. 
Novak, the Illinois Supreme Court applied an Illinois Highway Code statute 
retroactively based on the language of the statute that gave explicit tem-
poral directions.43 Recognizing the court’s new standard set forth in Caven-
ey, the court held that the Statute on Statute’s distinction between 
procedural and substantive property rights was only a default standard and 
did not apply to statutes in which the legislature clearly indicated a tem-
poral reach.44 If the statute’s temporal reach is indicated, “[T]here is no 
need to invoke [S]ection 4 of the Statute on Statutes.”45 In doing so, the 
court held that explicit legislative intent overrules judicial discretion in 
retroactivity cases unless doing so would be unconstitutional.46
Without a clear indication of temporal reach from the legislature, the 
Statute on Statutes provides an implied temporal default based on whether 
the rights are substantive or procedural. This means a judicial inquiry is 
 38.  Caveney, 797 N.E.2d at 601–602. 
 39.  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (1874). 
 40.  See Caveney, 797 N.E.2d at 603. 
 41.  See People v. Atkins, 838 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ill. 2005). 
 42.  See id.; Doe A. v. Diocese of Dall., 917 N.E.2d 475, 482 (Ill. 2009). 
 43.  Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 860 N.E.2d 246, 254 (Ill. 2006). 
 44.  Id. at 253.  
 45.  Id.
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required to determine if the rights are procedural and if they are, courts 
may apply procedural laws retroactively.47 Such a distinction is not always 
clear and “[i]t is often difficult to distinguish between statutes that are pro-
cedural and those that are substantive.”48 Illinois courts define procedural 
laws as the “mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as dis-
tinguished from the law which gives or defines the right.”49 For instance, in 
Deicke Center v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, the court held 
that a law altering the procedure for shutting down a nursing home applied 
retroactively because it only altered the steps necessary to complete the 
shutdown.50 Other examples of procedural laws include amendments to 
long arm statutes that change the mode of obtaining jurisdiction, changes in 
substitute service requirements, and a statute requiring new judges to pre-
side over post-criminal conviction relief hearings.51 If a statute affects the 
parties’ rights, it still may be considered procedural if it only changes the 
way in which the parties may enforce their rights.52 For instance, in 
Schweickert v. AG Services of America, Inc., the court interpreted a statute 
relating to the steps a property owner must take to retain first priority in 
repayments of debt incurred by a farmer-tenant.53 The court found the stat-
ute procedural and applied it retroactively because it did not create or alter 
any right, but merely altered the method by which a property owner could 
enforce his or her rights.54
On the other hand, statutes that alter parties’ rights under a preceding 
law may not have a retroactive effect. A substantive law is a statute that 
creates or defines a party’s right.55 In Caveney, legislative intent regarding 
the temporal reach for the statute in question was unclear, so the court’s 
decision turned on the nature of the law.56 In that case, the court found that 
a law that established income tax credits for certain corporation sharehold-
ers was clearly a substantive law because those shareholders’ property 
rights obtained under the old law would be diminished under the new law.57
Similarly, the Second Illinois Appellate Court ruled in Foster Wheeler 
 47.  Id. at 253. 
 48.  Schweickert v. AG Servs. of Am., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 49.  Id. (quoting Ogdon v. Gianakos, 114 N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ill. 1953)). 
 50.  906 N.E.2d 64, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 51.  See People v. Ruiz, 479 N.E.2d 922, 923–25 (Ill. 1985); Ogdon, 114 N.E.2d at 689; Ores v. 
Kennedy, 578 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
 52.  See Schweickert, 823 N.E.2d at 216. 
 53.  Id. at 216–17.
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Ogdon, 114 N.E.2d at 689. 
 56.  Caveney v. Bower, 797 N.E.2d 596, 603–604 (Ill. 2003). 
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Energy Corp. v. LSP Equipment, L.L.C. that a statute dealing with forum 
selection for construction contracts in Illinois is substantive law rather than 
procedural.58 Although that change appears to be procedural on its face, the 
court held that it represented a substantive change in the law because it 
interferes with parties’ right to contract.59 The inquiry turns on whether 
applying the law retroactively will affect the parties’ rights as they under-
stood them at the time their agreement or actions took place. 
Using these principles, we turn to Richie and Homer. The Civil Union 
Act is silent on retroactivity, and nothing in the text shows a clear legisla-
tive intent to make it retroactive. The section of the Act controlling reci-
procity only states that Illinois shall recognize a civil union from another 
jurisdiction without providing any temporal instructions.60 Because the 
statute is silent on its temporal reach, the first prong of the reciprocity test 
is irrelevant and the court must look to the second prong and determine if 
the Civil Union Act substantively affects Richie and Homer’s rights. 
When Richie and Homer entered into their civil union, they did so 
with the knowledge that their actions had no legal effect in Illinois. As far 
as they knew, their relationship would never be subject to Illinois laws, 
such as the division of marital property under the Marriage Act. If they 
would have thought of that outcome, they could have taken steps to avoid 
comingling their assets or signed an extra-marital contract to divide assets. 
For instance, Illinois recognizes the validity of pre-nuptial agreements and 
enforces such agreements under traditional contracts doctrine.61 Alterna-
tively, the parties could have taken steps to ensure their pre-marital assets 
remained separate from marital assets. Private assets held by a person prior 
to a marriage can be transmuted into marital property by an affirmative 
action from a spouse, such as contribution of that property into the marital 
estate.62 If Richie and Homer knew that entering into a civil union would 
comingle their assets, they could have taken steps ensuring that their pre-
marital assets or exempt assets remained isolated. 
Holding that the Civil Union Act retroactively applies to the date of 
their civil union ceremony in Vermont would unjustly alter their property 
rights in a way the parties did not choose to contract between themselves. 
Just as the law in Foster Wheeler was substantive because it altered parties’ 
 58.  805 N.E.2d 688, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 59.  Id.; see also Weisberg v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 464 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984) (declining to apply a statute retroactively because to do so would violate “the general constitu-
tional principle that the legislature may not enact laws which impair the obligation of contracts.”). 
 60.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/60 (2011) (amended 2013). 
 61.  See In re Marriage of Drag, 762 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).  
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contractual rights, applying the Civil Union Act retroactively would essen-
tially rewrite the parties’ rights in a way they did not bargain or plan for in 
2002.63 Marriage is a type of contract,64 and blindly altering the terms of 
that contract nearly a decade after the parties entered into it is substantively 
unjust. Applying the Civil Union Act retroactively undoubtedly affects 
substantive rights rather than procedural rights as it is both creating and 
defining rights and is not a mere “mode of proceeding.” Prior to the Civil 
Union Act, Richie and Homer had no right to one another’s property under 
Illinois law. The Act is therefore substantive as it both creates and defines 
the right as the equitable distribution of marital property. 
Therefore, the court should not apply the Civil Union Act retroactive-
ly. Without legislative guidance on the intended temporal reach of the Act, 
the court is bound to focus on the substantive implications of holding a 
statute to be retroactive. Because the Act is clearly substantive, the courts 
must apply the statute prospectively. 
B. Marital Analogy 
In addition to a statutory analysis supporting a finding that Illinois 
courts should only apply the Civil Union Act prospectively, analyzing the 
situation as if it were a heterosexual marriage also supports that conclusion. 
The Act states that the courts should afford same-sex relationships the same 
“obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded or recog-
nized by the law of Illinois to spouses.”65 This means that the courts should 
construe the Act with the Marriage Act in mind.66 Section 213 of the Mar-
riage Act controls the validity of marriages that were invalid at the time of 
contracting.67 That section states that all: 
marriages contracted within this State, prior to the effective date of this 
Act, or outside this State, that were valid at the time of the contract or 
subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they were con-
tracted or by the domicile of the parties, are valid in this State, except 
where contrary to the public policy of this State.68
Illinois courts have interpreted this section to mean that a marriage 
that is invalid at the time of contracting effectively becomes valid the mo-
ment the marriage becomes legal.69 This is consistent with the common 
 63.  See 805 N.E.2d at 694.  
 64.  Larson v. Larson, 192 N.E.2d 594, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). 
 65.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/5 (2011). 
 66.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/45. 
 67.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213 (1977). 
 68.  Id.





      01/14/2015   15:25:42
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 180 Side B      01/14/2015   15:25:42
P12 - SHINABARGER (FINAL).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/22/2014 11:11 AM 
346 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 90:1 
law’s treatment of marriage after the removal of an impediment.70 General-
ly, when a marriage is invalid at the time of its inception, “the parties to 
such a marriage who cohabit after the removal of such impediment are 
lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment.”71 Alt-
hough Illinois has not recognized common law marriage in over a century, 
Illinois courts still apply this concept. For instance, in In re Estate of 
Banks, the Fifth District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that an invalid 
out-of-state marriage became valid and effective the moment the couple 
resolved the situation that originally invalidated the marriage.72 In that case, 
a man married a woman in Arkansas despite the fact that the divorce for his 
previous marriage was still pending.73 Because Section 212(a) of the Mar-
riage Act invalidates a marriage entered into before the dissolution of a 
previous marriage, the marriage was invalid in Illinois at the time it was 
contracted into.74 A short time later, the first marriage’s divorce became 
official, and the Illinois court was asked to rule on the validity of the sec-
ond marriage.75 The court ruled that, “prohibited bigamous marriages be-
come valid marriages at the time the impediment to the marriage is 
removed.”76 This meant that the couple’s effective marriage date was the 
date of the first marriage’s divorce rather than the date of the second mar-
riage’s actual ceremony or the date they filed their marriage papers.77 This 
legalization took effect automatically upon the removal of the impediment 
without any further action by the couple.78
The court’s treatment of marriages entered into prior to their validity 
relates directly to Richie and Homer. At the time of the two parties’ con-
tacting into a civil union in Vermont in 2002, Illinois did not recognize 
those types of relationships, just as Illinois does not recognize bigamy.
However, just as a subsequent legal action saved the eventual validity of 
the marriage in Banks, the parties’ civil union in this case eventually had 
legal effect.79 In Banks, the saving action was the formal dissolution of the 





 71.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 72.  629 N.E.2d at 1225. 
 73.  Id.
 74.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a) (2014). 
 75.  Banks, 629 N.E.2d at 1225. 
 76.  Id. at 1226.  
 77.  Id.
 78.  Id. 
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first marriage.80 For Richie and Homer, their legal relationship did not 
come to fruition until the Civil Union Act became effective on June 1, 
2011. Illinois law does not recognize certain types of unions that it deems 
to be against public policy, but that does not mean that an invalid union is 
forever doomed.81 Once the legislature determines that the union is no 
longer against public policy or the parties change the circumstances of the 
union to cure the problem, the state recognizes the relationship. Invalidity 
within the relationship does not destroy the union, but rather pauses it until 
the state is willing to accept it formally. 
Because civil unions have the same rights and obligations as marriag-
es, the parties’ civil union requires state approval to be official. Therefore, 
Richie and Homer’s union is effective from the time their relationship re-
ceived legal validation, not from the time they actually entered into their 
relationship. Holding otherwise would lead the court to recognize a type of 
common law marriage, which has been illegal in Illinois since 1905.82 Alt-
hough Illinois generally recognizes marriages from other states, if a person 
is domiciled in Illinois and continues to be so, any marriage they enter into 
outside of Illinois must be valid under Illinois law.83 Common law marriag-
es are agreements showing that “the parties presently intend to become 
husband and wife, contemplating a permanent union, exclusive of all oth-
ers.”84 Illinois may recognize common law marriages between two citizens 
of another state after they move to Illinois, but not two Illinois citizens who 
go to another state for the sole purpose of entering into a prohibited un-
ion.85
In our hypothetical fact pattern, because Illinois did not recognize 
same-sex civil unions in 2002, Richie and Homer went to Vermont to enter 
into their union and then returned to their domicile in Illinois. Common law 
marriages are inconsistent with the public policy of Illinois because they 
take the state out of the relationship and the state has no ability to control 
the relationship. Recognizing that Richie and Homer entered into a binding 
agreement in 2002 would essentially validate their contractual relationship, 
entered into without the state’s consent, and recognize a type of common 
law marriage. This flies in the face of over a century of tradition. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/25 (2011).
 82.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/214 (2013). 
 83.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216; Stevens v. Stevens, 304 Ill. 297, 300 (1922) (holding that 
marriage contracted between citizens of Illinois in another state in disregard of the statutes of Illinois 
will not be recognized in the courts of the latter state though valid where contracted).  
 84.  In re Enoch’s Estate, 201 N.E.2d 682, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964). 
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In summary, using the limited marital case law as a guidepost creates 
a presumption that Illinois courts will not apply the Acts retroactively but 
rather prospectively from the point in which the parties’ relationship be-
came “perfected.” This perfection occurs at the time the state legally rec-
ognizes the relationship. Holding otherwise would recognize a type of 
common law marriage in the interim between the time the couple formed 
their relationship and the date the state officially took notice and recog-
nized the relationship. 
IV. PARTY INTENT
If a court agrees with the arguments listed above and is not inclined to 
hold that the Civil Union Act applies retroactively, Homer does have one 
arrow in his quiver. In Illinois, courts may look to party intent in determin-
ing whether attained property is marital.86 Looking at party intent is typical 
in other areas of law, most notably contract law, but is relatively unheard of 
in distributing marital property. Indeed, only Colorado, Illinois, Missouri, 
and New Jersey allow courts to consider party intent by asking whether 
parties purchased the pre-marital property in contemplation of marriage.87
The doctrine most often comes into play when a couple buys a house be-
fore their actual marriage but after they began making marriage arrange-
ments.88 Illinois courts have interpreted the Marriage Act as a “legislative 
preference . . . for the classification of property as marital” and allowing 
party intent to extend marital property to property acquired prior to the 
marriage is consistent with that interpretation.89
In contract law, the court’s principal objective in construing “a con-
tract is to determine and give effect to the intention of the parties at the 
time they entered into the agreement.”90 The court is not required to go 
inside the minds of the parties in question, but instead bases decisions on 
the objective manifestations of the parties’ intent.91 When a contract con-
tains ambiguity, the court is required to go beyond the four corners of the 
contract and look elsewhere to find the parties’ intent.92
Illinois courts apply a similar doctrine to the marriage contract. Even 
so, the contemplation of marriage doctrine is narrowly focused and very 
 86.  TURNER, supra note 4, at 4. 
 87.  Id.
 88.  See In re Marriage of Jacks, 558 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 89.  See In re Marriage of Smith, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Ill. 1981). 
 90.  Urban Sites of Chi., L.L.C. v. Crown Castle U.S.A., 979 N.E.2d 480, 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 91.  Id. at 496. 
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limited.93 The courts generally state that the timeline of the parties’ mar-
riage is not determinative and “[p]roperty is not rendered non-marital simp-
ly because a contract for its purchase was signed before the marriage.”94
For property to qualify as marital within the contemplation of marriage 
doctrine, it generally must be used for a familial purpose95 and as the name 
implies, is only relevant if the parties were actually contemplating marriage 
at the time they acquired the property in question.96 Although the vast ma-
jority of cases invoking the contemplation of marriage doctrine involve 
housing or real estate, it may also apply to other types of property.97 This 
means the courts look to fact-based inquires to help objectively determine 
whether the parties’ intended98 to purchase the property for the marital 
estate.99 One of the key factors in determining if parties purchased the 
property in contemplation of marriage is the temporal nearness between the 
purchase and the marriage.100 The less time between the two, the more like-
ly the court will find the property to be marital property.101 Ultimately, the 
determination of whether an asset is marital property is a question of fact 
based on testimony of the witnesses and the parties with the party seeking 
to prove that the pre-marriage property is marital property carrying the 
burden of proof.102
The contemplation of marriage doctrine substitutes a strict reading of 
the Marriage Act for a more flexible reading. Rather than starting the mari-
tal property clock the instant the couple walks down the aisle, the court 
flexibly attempts to consider intent. A quintessential example of this doc-
trine occurred in In re Marriage of Jacks.103 In that case, a couple pur-
chased a house shortly after their engagement but prior to their marriage.104
The wife’s name appeared on the offer sheet, but the title was solely in the 
 93.  TURNER, supra note 4, at 4–5 (laying out the requirements and criticism of the doctrine). 
 94.  In re Marriage of Dann, 973 N.E.2d 498, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  
 95.  See In re Marriage of Tatham, 527 N.E.2d 1351, 1361–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a 
farm tractor acquired before marriage is not comparable to a familial home). 
 96.  TURNER, supra note 4, at 4. 
 97.  In re Marriage of Schriner, 410 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that bedroom 
furniture was purchased in contemplation of marriage and for familial use). 
 98.  See In re Marriage of Olbrecht, 597 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
 99.  See In re Marriage of Smith, 638 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 100.  See In re Marriage of Jacks, 558 N.E.2d 106, 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 101.  Compare id. at 111 (finding that the parties purchased a house one hour before their marriage 
in contemplation of marriage), with In re Marriage of Leisner, 579 N.E.2d 1091, 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (holding that a home bought 19 months before marriage was separate property). 
 102.  See In re Marriage of Smith, 638 N.E.2d at 387. 
 103.  558 N.E.2d at 109. 
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husband’s name.105 After analyzing the Marriage Act, the court held that 
the house was property acquired in contemplation of marriage and there-
fore qualified as marital property.106 The court viewed such a holding in 
line with legislative intent and consistent with contract law’s reliance on 
party intent.107 In determining the parties’ intent, the court looked at the 
totality of the circumstances.108 For instance, the parties actually lived in 
the house, purchased the house due to its size and the size of the family, 
purchased the house only an hour before the wedding, and made mortgage 
payments with marital assets.109
Applying the contemplation of marriage doctrine to Richie and 
Homer’s situation is not perfect, but the same reasoning applies. Richie and 
Homer may have purchased a house, among other property, prior to their 
legal “marriage” when the Illinois legislature passed the Civil Union Act in 
2011, but they did so with the knowledge that they may never have a legal 
relationship. The couple also used much of the property, most notably 
Richie’s successful business, for non-familial purposes. Finding that start-
ing a business qualifies as property acquired in contemplation of marriage 
would be a significant expansion of the doctrine. In addition, Richie and 
Homer purchased much of their property well before 2011, so if a court 
looks at the totality of the circumstances, it is likely to find that the doctrine 
does not apply. 
Even though applying the actual contemplation of marriage doctrine to 
this situation is like fitting a square peg in a round hole, the reasoning be-
hind the doctrine still applies. Contemplation of marriage is designed to 
consider parties’ intent and hold them accountable for their intended ac-
tions. In the same way, a court should take Richie and Homer’s intent into 
account when equitably dividing their property. If Richie and Homer truly 
meant to enter into a binding relationship in 2002 and structured their lives 
to that end, Richie should not benefit just because the state technically did 
not recognize their relationship until 2011. This would be a windfall for 
Richie and would not recognize Homer’s contributions to the relationship 
or the commitment the two made to each other. Just as in applying contem-
plation of marriage, the court could look to the totality of the circumstances 
to determine if intent should apply to Richie and Homer. Did the two truly 
live with the expectation that the state would eventually recognize their 
 105.  Id. at 108. 
 106.  Id. at 111. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
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legal relationship? Did they treat all of their property as jointly held? Was 
Richie’s business discussed as a joint venture or as Richie’s sole property 
and endeavor? Taking intent into account will allow the court to reach an 
equitable solution that can more flexibly take the unique facts of this case 
into account. 
While Richie and Homer’s situation does not fit within the narrow 
framework of the contemplation of marriage doctrine, a court seeking an 
equitable remedy and wishing to hold the parties to their intended agree-
ment could use party intent as a reason to do so. The two formed a contract 
in 2002, and if the court finds that they intended it to be binding, it is pos-
sible the court would hold them to that agreement regardless of the retroac-
tive application of the Civil Union Act. 
V. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SAME-SEX CIVIL UNIONS IN 
OTHER CONTEXTS
The issue of dividing marital property is far from the only one of con-
tention in determining the retroactive effect of legalizing same-sex unions. 
Particularly, it is useful to look at how courts and legislators are treating 
two other areas of law: employee benefits and child custody. If civil unions 
have retroactive effect in these contexts, it makes sense to continue that 
practice and apply civil unions retroactively for purposes of marital proper-
ty.
A. Retroactive Effect of Legalizing Same-Sex Unions in Employment 
Benefits Law 
Turning first to employee benefits, this topic became a huge point of 
contention following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Wind-
sor on June 26, 2013.110 In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of DOMA, discussed further infra. Section 3 of DOMA 
amended the Dictionary Act to define marriage as “only a legal union be-
tween one man and one woman” and spouse as “a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.”111 Until the Windsor decision, DOMA had 
the effect of denying federal benefits, such as Social Security or employee 
benefits protected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA),112 to same-sex couples as they could not meet the definition of 
 110.  See generally Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 111.  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
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“spouse” under those statutes.113 While Windsor did not strike down 
DOMA as a whole, the Court did find Section 3 unconstitutional.114 This 
means that federal law no longer defines marriage as heterosexual. It also 
opens up the door for same-sex spouses to receive the same federal benefits 
as heterosexual spouses. 
Unfortunately, Windsor created as many questions as it answered in 
terms of sorting out the practical effect of this new definition and left ad-
ministrative agencies to their own devices in interpreting the decision’s 
effect.115 For instance, the Office of Personnel Management issued a notice 
on July 8, 2013, stating that it would recognize all same-sex marriages for 
benefit coverage, but not civil unions.116 A month later, the Department of 
Labor issued guidance stating that it would look to the laws of the state of 
residence to determine whether a particular couple is eligible for bene-
fits.117 Most observers eagerly await forthcoming Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) guidance on this issue.118 Specifically, observers expect the IRS to 
provide guidance on the extent that the federal government will apply 
Windsor retroactively.119 The IRS has indicated that it will apply Windsor 
retroactively for tax purposes to some extent, but so far it has only released 
rules with a prospective effect.120 In the rules already released, the IRS has 
adopted Windsor’s definition of “spouse” to include same-sex couples and 
also stated that it recognizes the validity of such unions based on the laws 
of the state they are entered into rather than the state of domicile.121 How-
ever, these rulings are only applied prospectively as of September 16, 
2013.122
In one of the first cases to consider Windsor’s retroactive effect, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied federal sur-
 113.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (stating that DOMA controlled over 1,000 statutes in denying 
benefits to same-sex couples). 
 114.  Id. at 2695–96. 
 115.  Susan Hoffman et al., Same-Sex Marriages and Benefit Plans after Windsor, 28 WESTLAW J.
EMP. 1, 3 (2013). 
 116.  Benefits Administration Letter from John O’Brien, Dir. for Healthcare and Ins., Office of 
Pers. Mgmt. (July 17, 2013), available at https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-
forms/benefits-administration-letters/2013/13-203.pdf. 
 117.  Hoffman et al., supra note 115, at 2 n.4. 
 118.  Implications of Supreme Court’s DOMA Decision on Retirement Plans, CCH INC. (2013), 
available at 2013 WL 4521259. 
 119.  Id.
 120.  Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 204. 
 121.  Id. at 202, 203. 
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vivor benefits retroactively.123 In that case, Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. To-
bits, a same-sex couple entered into marriage in 2006 in Canada and were 
married and domiciled together until one partner’s death from cancer in 
2010.124 Both the surviving spouse and the decedent’s parents requested 
death benefits in accordance with ERISA, but a conclusion of the litigation 
was postponed given the Supreme Court’s imminent ruling in Windsor.125
In light of the Windsor decision, the court quickly and emphatically held 
that the surviving partner was the deceased partner’s “spouse” and entitled 
to the death benefits.126 Interestingly, the court purported to apply Illinois 
law to the case and held that “[t]here can be no doubt that Illinois, the cou-
ple’s place of domicile, would consider” the survivor the decedent’s 
spouse.127 In support of this conclusion, the court cited the Civil Union Act 
as well as an order from an Illinois probate court declaring the civil union 
valid and the surviving partner the sole heir to the estate.128 The district 
court reasoned that the probate court’s decision, entered into in 2011, 
equaled Illinois’ retroactive acceptance of the couple’s 2006 Canadian 
marriage.129
As has already been discussed at some length, this conclusion is far 
from a sure thing as the district court assumes. The fact that Illinois no 
longer forbids same-sex unions does not mean that such unions have a ret-
roactive effect. Despite the fact that the couple in this case was never legal-
ly unionized, either by Illinois or federal standards, during the decedent’s 
lifetime, should have raised a serious discussion regarding the civil union’s 
timeline. It did not, and the court merely assumed that Windsor applied
retroactively and put those same words in the Illinois judiciary’s collective 
mouth. This may be an example of the court finding an equitable solution 
and working backwards to find reasoning to support that conclusion. 
Richie and Homer’s situation is substantially different from the retro-
active application of ERISA benefits, but this case shows that at least some 
federal courts are willing to find that same-sex unions have retroactive 
legalization dates. However, regardless of this one decision in Pennsylva-
 123.  Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, No. 11-0045, 2013 WL 3878688, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 
2013). 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at *4. 
 127.  Id.
 128.  Id. n.29; Order Declaring Heirship, In re Estate of Farley, No. 2010P006742 (Ill. Prob. Ct. 
2010), available at http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org (follow “Online Case Info” to “Probate 
Docket Search”; then search by case number using “2010” for year, “P” for division code, and 
“006742” for case number) (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
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nia, it is yet unclear whether employee and federal benefits will have a 
prospective or retroactive effect in the wake of Windsor. Once the IRS 
stakes out its position, this question should become much clearer. 
B. Civil Unions and Parental Rights 
Another grey area in the new arena of same-sex civil union law is in 
parental rights. Prior to the Act’s passage, for both parties in a same-sex 
union to have parental rights, the non-biological partner had to follow nor-
mal adoption procedures (in the case of one party being the biological par-
ent), or both parties had to individually go through adoption proceedings.130
Regarding parental rights, the Civil Union Act essentially applies Section 
303 of the Marriage Act, which outlines procedures for handling parental 
rights, to civil unions.131 Unfortunately, the Civil Union Act does not pro-
vide guidance regarding the effect of having children in a union prior to the 
passage of the Acts.132
Regardless of the Act’s silence, it is likely that both parties to the un-
ion have some parental rights regardless of the Act’s retroactivity.133 Given 
same-sex couples’ obvious inability to procreate as a heterosexual couple 
does, it is impossible to directly apply traditional laws designed for hetero-
sexual couples. However, that has not stopped Illinois courts from attempt-
ing to adapt these traditional laws for same-sex couples. For instance, in In 
re T.P.S., the court used common law contract doctrine to hold that a per-
son could not deny parental rights to a former same-sex partner when the 
two raised the children in question jointly.134 In that case, the court con-
cluded that the Illinois legislature did not intend to deny children the sup-
port of their caregivers or create an inflexible standard when it passed 
legislation relating to heterosexual couples using artificial insemination.135
The couple in this case never entered into a union or marriage, but both 
parties were still given parental rights based on the common law.136
Applying this analogy, as well as the federal benefits analogy, to 
Richie and Homer does little to clear the waters. In an important issue of 
first impression, it is unlikely that an Illinois court will be as willing as the 
 130.  Carolyn D. Jansons, Meeting New Challenges in Same-Sex Civil Union and Maintenance 
Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN ILLINOIS, 2014 EDITION (2013), available at 2013 WL 
5755115. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id.
 133.  Id.
 134.  In re T.P.S. and K.M.S., 978 N.E.2d 1070, 1084–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
 135.  Id. at 1077–79. 
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Pennsylvania court to blindly accept the retroactivity of civil unions. The 
Pennsylvania court’s assumption that entering into a marriage relationship 
should be binding regardless of the state’s law is reasonable enough, but 
the parties’ substantive rights still must be taken into account. Unfortunate-
ly, the parenting analogy provides even less insight. Unlike T.P.S., an Illi-
nois court cannot fall back to common law to find an equitable remedy as 
Illinois explicitly refused to recognize common law marriages over 100 
years ago. The one helpful thread from these cases is that courts throughout 
the country have shown a willingness to find a path to an equitable solu-
tion. The equitable solution in this case, seemingly, is to hold the parties to 
their commitment, so it is possible that an Illinois court will merely start 
with that conclusion and work backwards until a solution presents itself. 
VI. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
In light of the aforementioned Windsor decision, it is also worth point-
ing out that Illinois is not constitutionally required to recognize out-of-state 
same-sex relationships and was not required to do so after Richie and 
Homer’s unionization in 2002. Generally, the states are required to give 
one another’s acts, records, and judgments the same weight as their own 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause found in Article IV of the Constitu-
tion.137 However, the Full Faith and Credit clause also allows Congress to 
prescribe the manner and effect of this full faith and credit.138 Congress did 
just this by passing DOMA in 1996.139
DOMA was a direct response by Congress to a growing push for the 
legalization of same-sex relationships.140 As discussed above, Section 3 of 
DOMA defined marriage under federal law. That section is no longer rele-
vant after the Windsor decision held it unconstitutional. However, Section 
2 remains, and it allows states to choose not to recognize same-sex mar-
riages or unions originating in sister states.141 The Illinois legislature took 
advantage of Section 2 by enacting legislation clearly stating that same-sex 
relationships are against public policy under Illinois law.142 Section 2 of 
DOMA states that: 
 137.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 138.  Id.
 139.  See Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 
2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
 140.  ANN M. HARALAMBIE, Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, in 
HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE AND ADOPTION CASES § 8:7 (updated Nov. 2013). 
 141.  28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
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No State, territory, or possession of the United States . . . shall be re-
quired to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe or a right or claim 
arising from such a relationship.143
As noted, the Illinois legislature used this caveat to pass legislation 
stating, “[a] marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex is contrary to 
the public policy of this State.”144 This legislation, when combined with 
DOMA, effectively trumps the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This language 
was removed from Illinois law with the Fairness Act in 2013.145
Regardless of Section 2’s protection against forced interstate same-sex 
recognition prior to the Fairness Act, the possibility of such an action re-
mained a point of contention in several states, including Illinois. In 1999, 
the Vermont Supreme Court struck down bans on same-sex civil unions as 
unconstitutional under the state’s constitution,146 and the Vermont legisla-
ture followed that decision by legalizing same-sex civil unions a year lat-
er.147 In the aftermath of these events in Vermont, Illinois lawmakers raised 
the question of whether the Vermont decision would force Illinois to rec-
ognize unions formed by Illinois same-sex couples in Vermont. In re-
sponse, former Illinois Attorney General James Ryan sent an interpretive 
letter to an Illinois state senator in 2000.148 In the letter, Ryan stated that 
Illinois was not required to recognize the Vermont unions because DOMA 
explicitly limits the application of full faith and credit in regards to same-
sex unions.149 Because, at the time, Illinois statutorily considered same-sex 
unions as against public policy, DOMA protected Illinois lawmakers from 
being forced to recognize Vermont same-sex unions. Although the Su-
preme Court struck down Section 3 of DOMA as unconstitutional in United
States v. Windsor, it upheld Section 2.150 Therefore, a state’s ability to de-
termine the validity of other states’ same-sex unions is still possible. 
For these reasons, Richie and Homer’s civil union was not valid in Il-
linois upon its creation in Vermont in 2002. Illinois was not required to—
and in fact for a decade did not—recognize same-sex relationships it 
 143.  § 1738C. 
 144.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213. 
 145.  S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. 4 (Ill. 2014).
 146.  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 147.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–02 (2000). 
 148.  Letter from Jim Ryan, Ill. Att’y Gen., to Edward Petka, Ill. State Sen. (Dec. 29, 2000), avail-
able at http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/2000/00-017.pdf. 
 149.  Id. at 6–11. 
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deemed contrary to its public policy under Full Faith and Credit case law 
thanks to Section 2 of DOMA.151 Until 2011, Illinois law clearly stated that 
same-sex civil relationships were contrary to public policy, meaning Illi-
nois did not recognize Richie and Homer’s Vermont civil union.152 While 
that changed after the Illinois legislature passed the Civil Union Act and 
Illinois began recognizing civil unions entered into both in Illinois and 
other states, it does not change the fact that Illinois did not consider Richie 
and Homer to be in a legal relationship until 2011. That brings the discus-
sion back to the retroactivity questions discussed supra. Both the case law 
and the letter to the Illinois senator demonstrate that Illinois never intended 
to recognize unions prior to the passage of the Civil Union Act. To find that 
the couple unionized in 2002 instead of 2011 would be to rewrite over a 
decade of history and create a number of substantive and procedural di-
lemmas for the courts.
CONCLUSION
Based on these arguments, Illinois courts should find that the Civil 
Union Act applies only prospectively for purposes of dividing marital 
property. This means that couples such as Richie and Homer began acquir-
ing marital property on June 1, 2011, the date that the Civil Union Act be-
came effective. Illinois law requires substantive laws to have only a 
prospective effect without a clear temporal order from the legislation. The 
Civil Union Act lacks any temporal guidance, so a court should rule that 
the legislature did not intend the Civil Union Act to have a retroactive ef-
fect. 
In addition, because the Civil Union Act requires civil unions to have 
the same legal obligations and recognition as marriages, the Marriage Act’s 
treatment of invalid marriages is guiding. The Marriage Act allows invalid 
marriages that subsequently become valid to have legal effect from the date 
of the validation, and civil unions should follow the same pattern. In mar-
riages, the purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state is not allowing 
common law marriages. In the same way, allowing the Civil Union Act to 
have a retroactive effect will take the state out of the contractual relation-
ship between the parties and allow a kind of quasi common law civil union. 
One exception to the prospective application of the Civil Union Act 
arises out of party intent. In the event that the parties clearly entered into 
what they considered a binding marriage relationship and began acquiring 
 151.  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979). 
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property for joint use, equity may demand that the court apply the Act ret-
roactively. While this contemplation of marriage doctrine is extremely 
limited, a court seeking an equitable remedy may rely on it to reach a just 
conclusion. 
Finally, Illinois is not required to give full faith and credit to the Ver-
mont civil union registration because Congress effectively legislated the 
effect, or lack thereof, of-out-state same-sex marriage through DOMA. 
Because Illinois law at the time of Richie and Homer’s unionization in 
Vermont clearly stated that such unions were against public policy, the 
state did not recognize the Vermont ceremony as permitted under Section 2 
of DOMA. While the Civil Union Act reversed this public policy senti-
ment, and Illinois now recognizes civil unions from other states, it did so 
only from June 1, 2011, onward. 
Unfortunately for Homer, it is unlikely that he is entitled to any portion of 
Richie’s successful business unless he can convince the court to rely solely 
on party intent. The question of marital property in this case so clearly im-
plicates a substantive right that any such argument will need to be very 
persuasive indeed. 
